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THE DUTY PROBLEM IN NEGLIGENCE CASES: II 
The Moral, Economic, Preventive and Justice Factors 
In the part of this paper published in an earlier number of the RE- 
VIEW,1 I sought to develop the idea that legal "duties" are determined 
by factors outside any legal theory which has yet crystallized. These 
factors were designated: (1) The administrative factor; (2) the moral 
or ethical factor; (3) the economic factor; (4) the prophylactic fac- 
tor; (5) the justice factor. The first was briefly discussed. Space 
limitations require that the others be dealt with in gross rather than 
singly,2 and in view of this I hastily point the direction taken by each 
of them. 
Probably the moral or ethical factor, best indicated in legal theory 
by "liability based on fault," is the most compelling influence upon 
judges when administration offers no obstacles. However hard to sub- 
ject to definition, the stabilization which the force we call morality gives 
is not to be doubted. The term is so broad and vague that it threatens 
to envelop all other factors. Probably for the purposes of this discus- 
sion it can best be identified by that partly philosophical, partly religious, 
partly ethical texture of intellectual tenets which reached their crest in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Here man was a free agent to 
be left to his own fortunes; he was fully capable of caring for himself; 
his conduct was either good or bad; through all things an eternal purpose 
ran; and all society must be ordered accordingly. Not far behind this 
moral-fibred ordering are the practical affairs of everyday life. In fact, 
to what extent the demands of a bread and butter existence control 
morals themselves is not a soluble inquiry. The two influences are never 
found divorced. A feudal economy required a morality of trespass; an 
emerging industrialism a morality of negligence. 
But in contrast with both moral and economic factors, which focus 
primarily upon the past and immediate present, is found a very strong 
desire on the part of judges, as well as other people, to fashion rules 
for a healthful future. Judges are inveterate prophets and legislators. 
They scale their penalties, they impose damages, both punitive and com- 
pensatory, not merely for the individual offender's lesson, but as a pre- 
(1928) 28 COLUMBIA LAW REV. 1014. 
'The difficulties of handling briefly the great mass of materials which lend 
themselves to this analysis are insuperable. It is probably better to run the 
story through than to lose it by over elaboration. I have chosen only a small part 
of the available materials and have refrained from giving references to support 
many generally accepted propositions. I have frequently cited articles and books 
rather than give a list of cases. 
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ventive of future harms. They spend much time fashioning prophy- 
lactic rules both of substantive and procedural design in their efforts to 
purify the social stream through the judicial process.3 Finally, when 
these other factors are not cramping, judges give attention to the parties 
before them. They place the loss where it will be felt the least and can 
best be borne. Despite protestation there is one "law" for the rich and 
strong and another for the poor and weak. Other factors being in 
equilibrium, the hurt plaintiff captures the heart of judges and jury 
alike. This is justice. It is not the usual thing for judges to minister 
justice, for most frequently procedure, and fault, and business, and 
future welfare require that justice wait until law has made adjustments 
on a larger scale.4 
3There are numerous instances of this sort. The decision in McPherson 
v. Buick Co., 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050 (1916) is a striking one. As an anti- 
toxin to human hurts it ranks along with those which medical science has dis- 
covered. It is the same preventive as employed against the manufacturers of 
drugs and food and electrical appliances, etc. (1928) 38 YALE L. J. 399. The 
"highest practicable degree of care" imposed upon railway carriers of passengers, 
and the exactions as to spark arresters for preventing fires are for a similar pur- 
pose. But these rules are not enough in themselves. Courts have supported them 
by a so-called "res ipsa loquitur" rule of evidence, a remarkable creation for 
making effective the administration of the prophylaxis. See Heckel and Harper, 
Effect of the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur (1928) 22 ILL. L. REV. 724. The rail- 
way passenger cases were once the normal damage suit, but they are now seldom 
litigated. The stringent rules in these and similar cases make it useless for de- 
fendants to litigate any but the most extreme cases. The habitual use of pre- 
sumptions as prophylactic measures is of course well recognized. One of the 
most effective uses of such a makeweight in combination with assessing damages 
is found in the "chimney sweeper's" case, Armory v. Delemirie, 1 Strange 505 
(1722). This case foreshadows the severe "highest intermediate value" rule. 
See McCormick, Highest Intermediate Value and Damages for Lost Chances 
(1924) 3 TEX. L. REV. 44. Another instance in a different field is the refusal of 
the Texas Supreme Court to give countenance to the Massachusetts Trust. 
This form of business organization lent itself too readily to the "oil frauds" 
which sprang up in Texas to dupe both residents and non-residents. The court 
would give it no recognition, although in getting rid of it, great violence had to 
be done to many well settled principles of law. See Thompson v. Schmitt, 115 
Tex. 53, 274 S. W. 554 (1925) and an excellent comment (1928) 37 YALE 
L. J. 1103, 1114. 
4 One of the best illustrations of the suggestion here made is found in the 
recent wire tapping cases. Olmstead v. U. S., 48 Sup. Ct. 564 (U. S. 1928). 
Barely hidden beneath the crust of constitutional phraseology of the majority 
opinion is the apprehension for the administrative processes of courts if the 4th 
Amendment is to be given the sweeping scope contended for and if the main lines 
of a case must be halted to await the determination of incidental issues involving 
the means of procuring evidence otherwise tellingly relevant. Against this factor 
Justice Brandeis sets off several different ones: (1) that other phase of adminis- 
tration which requires that it be stopped short of destroying the "liberty" it is 
designed to protect; (2) the desire to keep the court's scheme of administration 
in alignment with the progress of science. Here he is emphatic: "The progress of 
science in furnishing the government with means of espionage is not likely to 
stop with wire tapping .... Advances in the psychic and related sciences may 
bring means of exploring unexpected beliefs, thoughts and emotions." Ibid. 571. 
The need of a preventive against probable future ills weighs heavily with this 
Justice. Also (3) he added, to these the moral consideration that the govern- 
ment has sought "to avail itself of the fruits" of crimes "to accomplish its own 
256 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.21 on Thu, 13 Jun 2013 17:07:47 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
DUTY PROBLEM IN NEGLIGENCE CASES: II 257 
Much of the so-called progress made in legal science is of this sort 
-a realignment of word patterns. The opportunism in making classi- 
fications is constantly overlooked. There is no requirement that the 
legitimacy of a present useful way of looking at the legal set-up must be 
traceable back into the centuries. Where morals end and economics 
begin, where prevention against future harms rather than a present jus- 
tice to the parties before it dominates a court, is candidly the writer's 
own story. Each of these factors can be translated into any one of the 
others. Each can be noun or qualifying adjective as taste dictates. 
They are laid out separately here because they seem of greater im- 
portance in that form. They are inseparably intertwined in the earlier 
centuries, and doubtless they can only be distinguished now because 
use can be made of such distinctions. And may I indicate at this point 
that the objective of the discussion is to suggest that the larger problems 
of legal protection and responsibility are not soluble alone by formulas, 
doctrines, rules, phrases, definitions, or other devices of dialectic? I 
anticipate a further suggestion, viz., it is high time that attempts were 
being made to consolidate the few gains which have been made in deal- 
ing with these larger problems, rather than giving energies to the refine- 
ment of a technic of detail already obsolescent. 
Early Legal Theory 
The early centuries-the twelfth and thirteenth particularly-are 
dim even to the eyes of a highly equipped historian.5 The myths which 
have grown up about the judicial process of those obscure days never 
ends." Ibid. 574. Justice Holmes further bolsters this moral argument by dubbing 
the practice of paying for and accepting evidence obtained by methods which 
the government professes to condemn "a dirty business." Ibid. 575. Conservative 
Justice Butler, not satisfied with the majority view, nor with the contrary view falls 
back upon the time honored technic of construing "words" and "principles." He 
says: "This court has always construed the Constitution in the light of the 
principles upon which it was founded. The . . . literal meaning of the words 
used do not measure the purpose or scope of its provisions. . ." Ibid. 576. 
While all of these factors are pressed with the greatest vigor and ability, it is 
strange that there is not a single reference to the justness of the conviction. Was 
defendant guilty? Doubtless that was assumed. But justice had to wait until 
other matters were ironed out. In extenuation it may be said that the "order 
granting certiorari was to limit the argument to a single question." But Justice 
Stone aptly closes that escape with the remark: "I do not understand that it 
restrains the court from a consideration of any question which we find to be 
presented by the record for. . . this court determines a case here on cer- 
tiorari 'with the same power and authority and with like effect, as if the cause 
had been brought here by unrestricted writ of error or appeal.'" Ibid. 576. My 
comment is not a criticism of this or other courts for making the merits of the 
individual case await upon these other factors; it is merely to indicate that they 
do it. Incidentally, the influence of the administrative factor in shaping the 
rule here in question is neatly developed in a series of recent comments by 
Richard J. Smith. See (1926-27) 36 YALE L. J. 536, 988 and (1928) 38 YALE L. J. 
77. 
'Woodbine, The Origins of the Action of Trespass (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 799. 
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cease to give trouble.6 So able a scholar as Dean Ames concluded that 
"early law is formal and unmoral" and that the "ethical standard of 
reasonable conduct has replaced the unmoral standard of acting at one's 
peril."7 A similar attitude on the part of numerous writers is well stated 
by Street.8 "In the field of trespass liability is based solely upon the fact 
that damage is directly done by force. No consideration is here taken of 
the moral qualities of the act which results in damage. The actor may or 
may not be culpable or morally blameworthy." We have had much legal 
theory revolving about such terms as "absolute liability," or "acting at 
peril" as opposed to "liability based on fault" as though they were con- 
tradictory. Reconciliations have been thought necessary as though re- 
sponsibility is less moral when strict and highly moral when excuses 
are more liberally recognized.9 Probably this is more a matter of color- 
ful language than anything else. It is hardly to be imagined that there 
was ever a time when the particular dispute was settled without refer- 
ence to the reaction of the community as a whole to the decision. Over 
and above the hardships which a decision might impose upon a party to 
the litigation there must have always been a feeling that a general policy 
was involved. The highest quality of statesmanship is constantly ex- 
hibited in the settling of the specific dispute. The judicial process of 
the common law owes its strength to such statesmanship. It is not any 
longer venturesome to assume that the judgments of courts in the earlier 
centuries, like th6se of the present, are only to be understood in the light 
of the results which the judges thought the social order of the times 
required. And while there have been constant changes in the weight 
given the moral factor, as distinguished from the economic and other 
factors, it is probably nearer the truth to say that such emphasis has 
lessened rather than grown, and that instead of the responsibility of the 
earlier centuries being unmoral, it was more strictly moral than that of 
today. Another way of saying the same thing is that our morality has 
been expanded and liberalized. 
The protection which early common law courts gave to the in- 
dividual against harms to his interests of personality was given under 
the action of trespass.10 The risks against which protection was given 
under this action were few. Personal violence, or its threat, was the 
dominant one. All in all it seems that probably too much weight has 
eWinfield, The Myth of Absolute Liability (1926) 42 LAW Q. REV. 37. 
'Ames, Law and Morals (1908) 32 HARV. L. REV. 97; SELECTED SSAYS ON 
THE LAW OF TORTS (1924) 1. 
81 STREET, FOUNDATIONS LEGAL LIABILITY (1906) 2. 
Isaacs, Fault and Liability (1918) 31 HARV. L. REV. 954 (1918); SELECTED 
ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF TORTS (1924) 235. 
10Woodbine, The Origins of the Action of Trespass (1925) 34 YALE L. J. 
367-370. 
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been given the few fragmentarily reported cases and sweeping dicta 
which appear before the 1800's as to the arbitrariness with which re- 
sponsibility was imposed under this action. Dean Wigmore has out- 
lined the development which took place.'1 He says: "The evidence 
seems certain that the rationalization towards the line of present stand- 
ards began at a much earlier period than has been supposed. In other 
words, there has never been a time, in English law, since (say) the 
early 1500's, when the defendant in an action for trespass was not 
allowed to appeal to some standard of blame or fault in addition to and 
beyond the mere question of his act having been voluntary; i.e., grant- 
ing a voluntary act, he might still excuse himself (apart from excuses 
of self defense, consent and the like)."12 My only doubt here is that 
Dean Wigmore has been too conservative and did not set the beginning 
far enough back, say even before the origin of the action of trespass.13 
The phrases "acting at peril," "inevitable accident," "utterly without 
fault," "inevitable necessity" and similar phases, are so vague and gen- 
eral that almost anything can be read into them. The few cases and 
illustrations of responsibility for unintentional hurts which appear, in 
so far as the facts are given, could as well as not be instances of highly 
probable, though unintended, hurts.l4 There is no reason to suppose 
that they were not. And the same cases today under our more liberal 
rules would doubtless entail severe responsibility. When further clas- 
sification brought trespass on the case into prominence, the question 
which troubled the courts was not responsibility but whether the action 
was case or trespass. This is fully illustrated by cases both before and 
after Scott v. Shepherd.l5 It was only after the distinctions between 
trespass and trespass on the case became of little practical importance, 
so far as the protection of bodily integrity against the harms of violence 
was concerned, that courts were called upon to state with clearness and 
fullness the excuses and limitations hidden beneath those general vague 
terms in earlier use. Likewise, it was only then that there was any 
necessity of making the full distinctions between intentional and 
negligent hurts. It was the latter class in which the tremendous expan- 
sion both of risks and protection came about. 
1 Responsibility for Tortious Acts, Its History (1894) 7 HARV. L. REV. 315, 
383, 441; SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF TORTS (1924) 18 et seq. 
12 At p. 66 of SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF TORTS (1924). 1' Winfield, op. cit. supra note 6. 
1 See Appendix to Dean Wigmore's concluding article in SELECTED SSAYS ON 
THE LAW OF TORTS (1924) 79. But see HOLDSWORTH, ISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 
(1909) vol. 2, pp. 50-52, vol. 3, pp. 375-382. 
1"2 Wm. Bl. 892 (1773). 
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Master and Servant Cases 
The negligence network of legal theory was still formative when 
the industrial adventures of the 1800's were sent forward on so many 
lines by the use of steam and the numerous mechanical devices which 
followed its advent. The railroad, the steamboat, the saw mill, the cot- 
ton gin, the factories of all descriptions, gave this new legal set up all 
the work it could do. They likewise gave in the course of the century 
the old relation of master and servant an entirely new societal signifi- 
cance.16 And it is this relation about which so much of the responsibil- 
ity imposed for unintentional hurts grew up. Here there began a 
struggle between a legal theory woven of medieval morality and the 
demands of an ever expanding industrialism which has only now cul- 
minated in a victory for the latter. Fogs were never thicker than those 
produced in the thinking of judges about the protection which should be 
given against the risks to which the interests of personality were sub- 
jected by such developments. When the master-servant cases first began 
to come before the courts, it must be remembered that the negligence 
theory was freshly spun. The idea had emerged definitely through the 
action on the case. It had come into conflict with the action of trespass 
and trespass was giving ground before it rapidly.17 Assumed risk had 
found a place as a defense.18 As late as 1820 it had served to defeat an 
action against a landowner who had set spring-guns in the wood into 
which plaintiff had walked, knowing that there were guns in the wood.19 
Contributory negligence had begun to emerge as a distinct sort of as- 
sumed risk.20 "The ordinary prudent man" had been definitely brought 
16 See BEARD, WHITHFR MANKIND (1928) c. V (Labor), by Sidney and Beatrice Webb. 
7 Leame v. Bray, 3 East 593 (1803); Wakeman v. Robinson, 1 Bing. 213 
(1823); Sharrod v. Ry. Co., 4 Ex. 584 (1849); Holmes v. Mather, L. R. 10 Ex. 261 (1875). 
s Cruden v. Fentham, 2 Esp. 685 (1799); Clay v. Wood, 5 Esp. 44 (1803); 
Bohlen, Voluntary Assumption of Risk (1906) 20 HARV. L. REV. 14, 19; SELECTED 
ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF TORTS (1924) 497. 
9 Ilott v. Wilkes, 3 B. & Ald. 308 (1820). Many interesting arguments in- 
dicating strong practical tendencies were made by the judges in this case. Al- 
though the guns were merely set to prevent trespasses and not to preserve game, 
Best, J., makes this argument: "If you do not allow men of landed estates to 
preserve their game, you will not prevail on them to reside in the country. Their 
poor neighbours will thus lose their protection and kind offices; and the Gov- 
ernment, the support that it derives from an independent, enlightened and unpaid 
magistracy." Ibid. 320. Compare the equally strong moral argument of the 
same judge in Bird v. Holbrook, 4 Bing. 628, 641-643 (1828) (a spring gun case 
in which plaintiff had no notice) ... but there is no act which Christianity 
forbids, that the law will not reach; if it were otherwise, Christianity would not be as it has always been held to be, part of the law of England. ... But we want 
no authority in a case like the present; we put it on the principle that it is in- 
human to catch a man by means which may maim him or endanger his life, and, as far as human means can go, it is the object of English law to uphold humanity and the sanctions of religion." 
'0Butterfield v. Forrester, 11 East 60 (1809). 
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over from the bailment cases.21 Davies v. Mann22 as a limitation upon 
the newly discovered defense device of contributory negligence was just 
in the offing. 
The master had long been responsible to third persons for uninten- 
tional hurts caused by a servant's conduct, but he had never been called 
to account to a servant for negligent hurts caused either by another 
servant or the master himself. A servant had assumed the risks of 
his employment.23 Only at a very late date and in the most extreme 
cases was the servant given relief even against the harms intentionally 
inflicted upon him by the master.24 Unintended harms were wholly out 
of the question as a basis of responsibility. 
This was the background for Priestly v. Fowler in 1837.25 The 
case was very simple. Plaintiff, a servant, had received injuries to his 
person on account of the defects in a van which had been overloaded, 
both the defects and overloading being alleged to be due to the negli- 
gence of the defendant, so that when the van broke down the plaintiff 
was thrown with violence to the ground. Plaintiff had judgment, and 
rule was obtained to show cause why the judgment should not be ar- 
rested, on the ground that defendant was not liable in law under the 
circumstances stated in the declaration. Every benefit was given to 
the pleading, and Lord Abinger, speaking for the court of Exchequer 
recognized the responsibility of a master for the acts of his servant, 
but held there was no responsibility in this case. He said: 
"It is admitted that there is no precedent for the present action by a 
servant against a master. We are therefore to decide the question upon 
general principles, and in doing so we are at liberty to look at the conse- 
quences of a decision the one way or the other. 
If the master be liable to the servant in this action, the principle of that 
liability will be found to carry us to an alarming extent. He who is re- 
sponsible by his general duty, or by the terms of his contract, for all the 
consequences of negligence in a matter in which he is the principal, is 
responsible for the negligence of all his inferior agents. If the owner of the 
carriage is therefore responsible for the sufficiency of his carriage, he is 
responsible for the negligence of his coachmaker, or his harnessmaker, or 
his coachman." 
Thus Lord Abinger argues that to allow this action will be letting 
the master in for a great responsibility indeed. For, if the master is 
liable, for his own negligence, he will be liable for his servant's negli- 
21Vaughn v. Menlove, 3 Bing. N. C. 468 (1837). 
2210 M. & W. 546 (1842). 
"Southcote v. Stanley, 1 H. & N. 247 (1856). 
See 1 LABATT, MASTER & SERVANT (2d ed. 1913) ? 256. 
253 M. &W. 1 (1837). 
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gence also. The economic disruption of the domestic establishment as 
visioned by this judge cannot be portrayed save in his own words. He 
continues: 
"The footman, therefore, who rides behind the carriage, may have an 
action against the master for a defect in the carriage, owing to the negli- 
gence of the coachmaker, or for a defect in the harness arising from the 
negligence of the harnessmaker, or for drunkenness, neglect, or want of 
skill in the coachman; nor is there any reason why the principle should not, 
if applicable in this class of cases, extend to many others. The master, 
for example, would be liable to the servant for the negligence of the 
chambermaid for putting him into a damp bed; for that of the upholsterer, 
for sending in a crazy bedstead, whereby he was made to fall down while 
asleep and injure himself; for the negligence of the cook in not properly 
cleaning the copper vessels used in the kitchen; of the butcher, in supplying 
the family with meat of a quality injurious to the health; of the builder for a 
defect in the foundation of the house, whereby it fell, and injured both the 
master and the servant by the ruins. The inconvenience, not to say the 
absurdity of these consequences, affords a sufficient argument against the 
application of this principle to the present case." 
Thus Lord Abinger parades the dreadful economic consequences of 
such a principle to foreclose any hope servants might have had for com- 
pensation for hurts received in the service of their masters. But not 
satisfied with this argument, he resorts to a long recognized legal doc- 
trine: 
"But, in truth, the mere relation of the master and the servant never 
can imply an obligation on the part of the master to take more care of the 
servant than he may reasonably be expected to do of himself. . . . The 
servant is not bound to risk his safety in the service of his master, and may, 
if he thinks fit, decline any service in which he reasonably apprehends 
injury to himself; and in most of the cases in which danger may be in- 
curred, if not in all, he is just as likely to be acquainted with the probability 
and extent of it as the master." 
The court would invoke against the servant-a free agent-the 
defense of assumed risk in both its original form and as developed 
under the new doctrine of contributory negligence. But of most strik- 
ing significance is this final psychological argument: 
"In fact, to allow this sort of action to prevail would be an en- 
couragement to the servant to omit that diligence and caution which he is in 
duty bound to exercise on the behalf of his master, to protect him against 
the misconduct or negligence of others who serve him, and which diligence 
and caution, while they protect the master, are a much better security 
against any injury the servant may sustain by the negligence of others 
engaged under the same master, than any recourse against his master for 
damages could possibly afford." 
262 
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Thus was used the final argument which has been used in so many 
cases in which the courts are anxious to set up some rule which will 
purge and purify the conduct of human beings in their contacts. It is 
the judicial prophylaxis. Here by denying recovery to servants in- 
jured by the negligence of other servants, the maximum of protection 
would be exacted in behalf of their master's interests in order that they 
themselves would not be hurt. By virtue of the desire of self preserva- 
tion servants would be purged of their carelessness, and their conduct 
purified by the caution of self interest. A capital argument: And of 
all the subsequent cases, few, if any, got beyond the factors here relied 
upon, and in none were they stated more convincingly. Probably they 
were too convincing inasmuch as courts continued to rely on the argu- 
ments long after the factors beneath had fallen into radically different 
alignment. But notice that in this original case there was not a word 
spoken about the risk-bearing capacity as between the two parties to 
the litigation. As usual the court was more interested in the economy 
of the day-in principle-in rule making-in theory-than in justice. 
The complexity of human affairs constantly calls for just such treat- 
ment. Courts administer "law," the power of society to order itself; 
justice is one of the factors which determine how that power should be 
administered. 
Two master-servant cases arose almost immediately after Priestly 
v. Fowler; one in South Carolina,26 the other in Massachusetts.27 
Both cases involved injuries to railroad operatives by the neg- 
ligence of other employees. Apparently without having the benefit of 
the English precedent, the South Carolina court reached the same con- 
clusion and stressed the same factors with about the same emphasis. 
The same principles were held to govern the risks arising out of the 
new adventure of railroading as governed those incident to operating 
a van. For approximately half a century it apparently did not occur 
to lawyers that the assumptions (principles) at the basis of the master- 
servant relation with reference to horse drawn vehicles were inadequate 
as a basis of the same relation in railroad operations.28 Chief Justice 
Shaw for the Massachusetts court accepted both the conclusions and 
reasoning of the other two courts. He probably stressed even more 
than Lord Abinger the desirability of such a rule in order to protect the 
6 Murray v. South Carolina R. R., 1 McMullan's Law 385 (1841). 27 Farwell v. The Boston & Worcester R. R., 4 Met. 49 (Mass. 1842). 
8 One of the first protests is found in the opinion of Byles, J., in Clarke v. 
Holmes, 7 H. & N'. 937, 947 (1862). He says: "But the principles laid down in 
Priestly v. Fowler, and all the examples there given of their application, relate 
to the conveniences and casualties of ordinary or domestic life, and ought not to 
be strained so as to regulate the rights and liabilities arising from the use of 
dangerous machinery." 
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servant against the negligent conduct of his fellows. With this case the 
"fellow servant" doctrine became well settled, and probably no limita- 
tion upon the negligence theory of liability was ever employed so suc- 
cessfully. The English courts further emphasized it and the American 
courts did likewise.29 The name itself indicates that the voluntary as- 
sumption of risk was the dominant idea in this defense, although the 
other ideas stressed by Lord Abinger furnished substantial support. 
The same idea was at the basis of other defenses to actions by 
servants. In any case of this type if the servant knew the conditions of 
his employment, or was in a position where he should know the condi- 
tions as well as the master, he was held to have assumed the risks in- 
cident to such employment. The negligence of fellow servants was 
merely a part of this larger doctrine of assumed risk,30 which was given 
the broadest application for many years.31 In fact there was very little 
need of translating the risks to which servants were subjected into 
terms of contributory negligence until much later,32 but when that was 
done the assumption of risk idea was given its largest extension. It is 
generally stated that contributory negligence is something distinct from 
assumed risk,33 but it is believed that such opinion is due to the refine- 
29Pollock, C. B., in Vose v. The Lancashire v. Yorkshire Ry., 2 H. & N. 
728, 734 (1858), said: "Few rules of law are of greater practical importance. The 
law must have been the same long before it was enunciated in this court in the 
case of Priestly v. Fowler.... If not, such actions would have been of fre- 
quent occurrence. No such action, however, appears ever to have been brought 
before the decision of that case. We ought not to allow so important a decision 
to be frittered away by minute distinctions or the ingenuity of advocates." 
8"Alderson, B., in Hutchinson v. The York, Newcastle and Berwick Ry., 
5 Ex. 341, 351 (1850) said: "The principle is, that a servant, when he engaged 
to serve a master, undertakes, as between him and his master, to run all the ordi- 
nary risks of the service, and this includes the risk of negligence on the part of 
a fellow servant, whenever he is acting in discharge of his duty as servant of 
him who is the common master of both." 
S Skipp v. The Eastern Counties Ry., 9 Ex. 223 (1853); Dynen v. Leach, 
26 L. J. (N. s.) Ex. 221 (1857); Woodley v. Metropolitan District Ry., 2 Ex. D. 
384 (1877); Clarke v. Holmes, 7 H. & N. 937 (1862). See 17 LAW NOTES 206 
(Am. 1914.) 
32There are very few cases of contributory negligence on part of servants 
prior to 1870. See Senior v. Ward, 1 El. 385 (1859) ; Clark v. Holmes, 7 H. & N. 
937 (1862); Brown v. Maxwell, 6 Hill 592 (N. Y. 1844). In WHARTON, EGLI- 
GENCE (1874) there are very few early cases cited. See ? 244. In SHEARMAN 
& REDFIELD, NEGLIGENCE (3d ed. 1874), there are few such cases. But in the 4th 
edition (1888) there are several sections devoted to the subject. See ?207 
et seq. There are also many then recent cases cited. Of more significance is 
the change of the whole attitude of these writers on the general defense of as- 
sumed risk. They say: "This principle is, that the exemption of masters from 
liability to servants, for injuries caused by defects which the servants knew or 
ought to have known, is founded solely upon the general law of contributory 
negligence .. ." Ibid. ?208; also see ?? 177-180. BEACH, CONTRIBUTORY NEGLI- 
GENCE (1885) recites the rule that a servant's contributory negligence is a bar to 
the servant's action, but the cases cited are all recent. See ? 94 et seq. 
3See Bohlen, Contributory Negligence (1908) 21 HARV. L. REV. 233; VOL- 
UNTARY ASSUMPTION OF RrsK (1907) 20 ibid. 14; Schofield, Theory of Contrib- 
utory Negligence (1890) 3 ibid. 263; BEACH, op. cit. supra note 32, ??6, 8. 
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ments made necessary by the numerous doctrinal conflicts of the late 
1800's.34 Contributory negligence is merely a label for the sorts of as- 
sumed risks apposite to negligence. This term doubtless sounded less 
harsh and more righteous, especially at a time when assumed risk 
was being pushed to the furthest extreme by the English courts. It 
looks like using the same idea as a defense against the plaintiff as was 
used by him against the defendant. It had all the appearances of fair 
play. But in fact it developed into the harshest defense the courts have 
ever recognized. An admitted wrongdoer was completely absolved 
from his wrong at the expense of the injured party. 
Closely bound up with the idea of assumed risk was the further 
idea of "proximate cause." It had never played a part in intentional 
harms.35 The legal theory behind trespass was too transparent to give 
much place to "causes." But when the negligence concept was de- 
veloped, and the defense of contributory negligence arose, thus intro- 
ducing multiple fault factors, it was inevitable that this partly philosoph- 
ical, partly moral, attempt to trace out responsibility in terms of causes 
should receive great emphasis. Thus instead of "proximate cause" be- 
ing a possible basis of contributory negligence as has been suggested,36 
34 See 3 LABATT, op. cit. supra note 24, ? 1223 for indication of the confusion 
between the two defenses and for an attempt to discriminate them. See 17 
LAW NoTEs 206 (Am. 1914); also (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 831. 
35I do not overlook Vicars v. Wilcock, 8 East 1 (1806) nor Ward v. Week, 
7 Bing. 211 (1830), nor cases of that type which were dealing with the problem 
of limiting liability in intentional harms under the "natural and probable conse- 
quence" formula. See Bohlen, Contributory Negligence (1908) 21 HARV. L. REV. 
233; Beale, The Proximate Consequences of an Act (1920) 33 ibid. 633. This 
formula was taking form somewhat earlier than the "proximate cause" formula 
in negligence cases. These formulae soon became so interwoven that they could 
no longer be easily identified, but that was later in the century. The first very 
serious suggestion in English cases I have found of the two ideas being thought 
of as one is Pollock's dicta in Rigby v. Hewitt, 5 Ex. 239, 249 (1850) and in 
Greeland v. Chaplin, 5 Ex. 243 (1850). Before this Greenleaf in his book on 
EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1848) ? 256 had said: "The damage to be recovered must al- 
ways be the natural and proximate consequence of the act complained of. This 
rule is laid down in regard to special damages, but it applies to all damages" 
(citing SEDGWICK, DAMAGES [1869] c. iii). Both Greenleaf and Sedgwick are 
cited for this proposition in several early cases. See SEDGWICK, DAMAGES (5th ed. 
1869). None of these cases and none of those relied on by these authors involve 
causation but are cases dealing with limitations upon responsibility in intentional 
hurts in tort cases or in breaches of contract, usually dealt with as special 
damages, or remote or consequental damages, all terms of very long standing. 
Sedgwick seems to have been the first to associate the two ideas. He says 
(ibid. 56), evidently bringing forward an earlier statement: ". .. the law 
refuses to take into consideration any damages remotely resulting from the act 
complained of. This proposition, or one correlative to it is expressed in the 
maxim causa proxima, etc.' But on page 65 he says: "Mr. Greenleaf has said 
with more accuracy (quoting the sentence set out above from ? 256)." The 
phrase struck the imagination of many courts. But clearly he was talking 
about the older problem, and not the one set up in Butterfield v. Forrester, supra 
note 20. The association of two ideas has seldom caused so much trouble. 
36 See Bohlen, op. cit. supra note 35. Professor Beale makes the statement in 
his article (op. cit. supra note 35, at p. 636) that "in very few cases up to the 
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it is the most extravagant development of that ruthless defense. But 
it did not play much part in master-servant cases until contributory 
negligence had taken over many of the defensive grounds which had 
previously been recognized under assumed risk. Thus it was that as 
late as Thomas v. Quartermaine37 Bowen, L.J., could express the 
normal view of his century concerning the doctrine: "Contributory 
negligence in a plaintiff only means that he himself has contributed to 
the accident in such a sense as to render the defendant's breach of duty 
no longer its proximate cause." Thus could contributory fault be 
translated into "proximate cause." In this way the pain given by the 
contributory negligence defense was somewhat dissipated by an 
anaesthetizing phrase. What is more, the "last clear chance" limita- 
tion, itself a countervailing morality upon that of contributory negli- 
gence, but further accentuated the development of this least intelligible 
of all the doctrines of the negligence network.38 Although "proximate 
year 1900 is the proximity of the cause the subject of investigation." It is not 
clear what is meant by this statement. The "proximate cause" doctrine had 
raged throughout the 1800's after the rule in Butterfield v. Forrester, supra note 
20, became the vogue. That case itself was not radical. It was a case of sub- 
sequent negligence on plaintiff's part, the exact converse of the Davies and Mann 
situation more than thirty years later. It was accepted for a broader principle 
which included concurrent negligence on part of plaintiff and defendant. This 
marks the normal danger of principles: they are always stated more broadly than 
the case or else a new one is required for each case. As a result of the broad 
principle of this case, courts began tracing out the results of the respective 
faults of both plaintiff and defendant . At first it was done mildly. In Flower v. 
Adams, 2 Taunton 314 (1810), plaintiff's inability to handle his horse which was 
frightened by defendant's ashes, was held by Lawrence, J., "to be the immediate 
and proximate cause." Then followed, Vennal v. Garner, 1 C. & M. Ex. 20 
(1832); Hawkins v. Cooper, 8 C. & P. 473 (1838); Woolf v. Beard, 8 C. & P. 
373 (1838); then came the stronger statement of Parke, B., in Bridge v. The 
Grand Junction Ry., 3 M. & W. 244, 248 (1838): ". . . if by ordinary care he 
might have avoided them, he is the author of his own wrong." This was re- 
peated in Davies v. Mann, 10 M. & W. 546 (1842), and quoted in many subse- 
quent cases. Smith v. Dobson, 3 Man. & G. 59 (1841) marked further emphasis, 
and so did Greeland v. Chaplin, 5 Ex. 243 (1850). By the time of Dowell v. 
Steam Navigation Co., 5 E. & B. 194 (1858), the use of "proximate cause" is well 
in the vocabulary. Among Chief Justice Campbell's many uses of the term is 
this: "If it (plaintiff's fault) was a proximate cause of the collision, however 
much the steamer might be in fault, this action cannot be maintained." Subse- 
quent cases make great use of the term. See Tuff v. Warman, 2 C. B. (N. s.) 
739 (1857); same case 5 C. B. (N. s.) 573 (1858); Witherley v. Regents Canal 
Co., 12 C. B. (N. s.) 2 (1862). In the meantime the term had become current 
in American opinions. American text writers during the last 25 years of the 
century indicate what a large part it played in legal theory. See SHEARMAN &
REDFIELD, NEGLIGENCE (3d ed. 1874) ?? 8-10, 33; ibid. (4th ed. 1888) cc. II, VI; 
WHARTON, op. cit. supra note 32, c. III (Causal Relation), c. IX. (Contributory 
Negligence). It is doubtless a good guess that Wharton did more than any one 
else to disseminate this vicious doctrine in its most pernicious form. BEACH, 
op. cit. supra note 32, ?? 10, 11. The doctrine had been elaborated in multitudes 
of cases during the century and had reached a most intricate development before 
its end. 
"18 Q. B. D. 685, 694 (1887). "8 Davies v. Mann and subsequent cases cited in supra note 36. 
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cause" did nothing to extend responsibility, it proved one of the severest 
restrictions on imposing responsibility. It is mentioned here merely to 
call attention to the fact that to an already waterlogged morality theory 
of responsibility was added an additional deadweight of moral mysti- 
cism. Nor was this enough. There still remained that defensive strand 
of vicariousness-imputed negligence39-to be woven into this steadily 
darkening legal theology. 
But this multiple array of defensive moralities was too powerful 
and the courts quickly put limitations upon them. The so-called non- 
delegable duties were the most important of these.40 A servant did not 
assume the risks of his fellows' negligence if the master were negligent 
in employing competent fellow servants. Nor did a servant assume 
the risks due tol poor rules and organization, dangerous surroundings 
and defective machinery, if the master was negligent in these partic- 
ulars.41 The master's duties under these heads seemed to take many 
directions, but they were in fact merely devices for escaping the drastic 
defenses which had been put into the hands of masters. And when in 
time these duties upon the master pressed too heavily against the basic 
morality of the defenses, the courts again put limits on them. The re- 
sult was that the servant who entered upon his work or continued to 
work after knowing about the incompetency of his fellow servants, the 
inadequacy of the system of work, or the dangerous nature of the sur- 
roundings or the defective machinery, or any other failure of the 
master to perform his duties for the servant's protection, again en- 
countered the defenses of assumed risk and contributory negligence- 
as best suited the dialectic of the occasion. In some cases, where the 
master promised to repair a defect, or there was an emergency of one 
sort or another, further refinements were made to save the injured 
servant, but it was hard for him to escape these twin-moralities of as- 
sumed risk and contributory fault. Also in constantly expanding in- 
dustrial organizations it was not always easy to tell who were fellow 
servants. There were multitudes of employees of numerous ranks and 
classes. Obviously they could not all be treated on an equal footing. 
Many tests were required to make necessary distinctions: the vice 
principal doctrine, the departmental theory, the superior officer test, 
and the very important non-assignability of duty test. Every imagin- 
able means of balancing the moral notions which dominated the negli- 
39Thorogood v. Bryan, 8 C. B. 114 (1849); County Commissioners v. Beulah, 
138 Atl. 25 (Md. 1927); Brown v. Schendelman, 143 Atl. 42 (Del. 1928); Hazel 
v. Hooperton, 310 Ill. 38, 141 N. E. 392 (1923). See excellent note (1926) 74 
U. OF PA. L. REV. 86. 40 See 3 LABATT, op. cit. supra note 24, c. XXXV. 
See HUFFCUT, AGENCY (2d ed. 1901) ? 276. 
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gence theory of the 1800's and setting off one against the other must 
have been resorted to. There is no way to exaggerate what actually 
took place. The only complex negligence doctrine which was rejected 
even in part was the "degrees of negligence" device which was given so 
large currency by Sir William Jones' little book on Bailments in the late 
1700's.42 It is hard to understand why so practical an adjustment as the 
"comparative negligence" suggestion fell by the way so quickly.43 
Probably it was due to the violent reaction against the difficulties of the 
"degrees of negligence" that this one rational idea of the whole mass of 
moral rules was rejected so peremptorily. Nineteenth century morality 
was a severe thing. It demanded absolutes. Either a defendant was 
responsible or he was not. Compromises were not to be endured. Nor 
could the courts bear to see so much legal theory swept aside by a 
simple device of apportioning the damages and that done by laymen. A 
moral century required the balancing of moral formulas at the hands 
of experts in morality. Let it suffice to say that legal theory based on 
the notions underlying assumption of risk, buttressed by the arguments 
of domestic economy, and chastity of conduct born of hardship, as set 
forth by Lord Abinger, could be and was spun indefinitely. 
There is only one bright spot. Whenever a case for any reason 
broke through legal theory and reached the jury it was almost invariably 
decided against the master and for the servant. And what is more, the 
judges, both trial and appellate, found themselves so enmeshed in their 
theories that their only retreat in many cases was found in passing the 
matter to the jury. The superstructure of theory broke under its own 
weight. Verdicts were too constant and too overwhelming to be with- 
stood except in the most haphazard fashion. And the jury probably 
rendered the most important of its scanty service to legal science at this 
juncture. Seemingly, juries saw only the parties before them, an,d 
placed the risk where they thought it could best be borne. The judges 
had been interested in principles; juries were interested in doing justice 
between the parties. The judges evolved a nice scheme for determining 
2Hinton v. Dibbin, 2 Q. B. 646, 661 (1842); Wells v. N. Y. Central R. R., 
24 N. Y. 181 (1862). See SHEARMAN & REDFIELD, NEGLIGENCE (3d ed. 1874) c. II; 
(4th ed. 1888) c. III. The terms "gross" and "wilful" negligence are constantly 
used, and serve a good purpose, as makeweights to avoid the effects of contrib- 
utory negligence and in place of the "last clear chance" phraseology. They are 
used to extend the latter doctrine in jurisdictions which only purport to recognize 
the "discovered peril" branch of the doctrine. See my discussion, Contributory 
Negligence and Proximate Cause (1927) 6 N. C. L. REV. 3, 26, 27. See excellent 
article by F. Green, High Care and Gross Negligence (1928) 23 ILL. L. REV. 4. 
43 See cases cited in AMES & SMITH, CASES ON TORTS (Pound's ed. 1917) 
267-268; BEACH, op. cit. supra note 32, c. III, Comparative Negligence. See Pol- 
lock's remark in Greeland v. Chaplin, 5 Ex. 243 (1850). What the courts re- 
fused to undertake as impossible, they now do in nearly every state by virtue of 
some statute. 
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responsibility, the juries gave verdicts which wrecked the scheme. Juries 
held their ground here until legal theory could catch up with the new 
order of things which had emerged under the very eyes of the judges 
without most of them noticing it. But these theories had been developed 
under severe difficulties and were not to be cast aside without protest, for 
judges and lawyers had found them fascinating to create and to work 
with. And what is more, they are still respectable.44 
The first Employers' Liability Act was passed by Parliament in 
1880. By a divided court this act was construed to relieve the servant 
only of the "fellow-servant" defense.45 Bowen, L.J., said: "The true 
view in my opinion is that the Act . . . has placed the workman in a 
position as advantageous as, but no better than, that of the rest of the 
world who use the master's premises at his invitation on business." 
Both the defenses of assumption of risk and contributory negligence 
were otherwise left intact. In 1891 the House of Lords in Smith v. 
Baker46 gave some relief against the defense of assumed risk when 
invoked to defeat the action of a servant who had continued to work 
after knowing the danger. But the full lesson taught by the cases of 
this class which had come before the court was not appreciated until 
the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1906.47 
In America legislatures were contented with passing very restricted 
employers' liability acts applicable primarily to railroads, and even 
these were restricted in numerous particulars by the courts where they 
were allowed to stand at all.48 In 1911 the early workmen's compensa- 
tion act of the New York Legislature came before the New York Court 
of Appeals49 and was held unconstitutional. While the court recognized 
that the defenses of contributory negligence and the fellow servant rule 
could be abolished by legislation, it denied the legislative power to make 
an employer responsible for injury incurred without the fault of the 
employer. The court said :50 
4Moore v. Isenman, 143 Atl. 462 (Me. 1928); Zuverino v. Boston & M. 
R. R., 143 Atl. 308 (Vt. 1928); Flannery v. New York, O. & W. R. R., 29 F. 
(2d) 18 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928); New York, C. & St. L. R. R., 164 N. E. 288 (Ind. 
App. 1928). 
'5 Thomas v. Quartermaine, 18 Q. B. D. 685 (1887). 6 [1891] A. C. 325. 
'KNoWLES, LAW RELATING TO WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION (4th ed. 1924). 8 See Buford, Assumption of Risk Under the Federal Employers' Lia- 
bility Act (1915) 28 HARV. L. REV. 163; Second Employers' Liability Cases, 
223 U. S. 1; 32 Sup. Ct. 169 (1912); (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 831. The Supreme 
Court still maintains a none too liberal attitude towards cases which might well 
be held to fall within the Employers' Liability Act. See Unadilla Valley Ry. v. 
Caldine, 49 Sup. Ct. 91 (U. S. 1928); Kansas City So. Ry. v. Jones, 48 Sup. Ct. 
308 (U. S. 1928). 
'4Ives v. South Buffalo Ry., 201 N. Y. 271, 94 N'. E. 431 (1911). 
"Ibid. 293, 94 N. E. at 439. 
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"When our constitutions were adopted, it was the law of the land that 
no man who was without fault or negligence could be held liable in damages 
for injuries sustained by another. That is still the law. . . . The argument 
that the risk to an employee should be borne by the employer because it is 
inherent in the employment may be economically sound; but it is at war with 
the legal principle that no employer can be compelled to assume a risk which 
is inseparable from the work of the employee, and which may exist in spite 
of a degree of care by the employer far greater than may be exacted by 
the most drastic law." 
This but indicates how deeply ingrained this idea of "fault" had 
become in the thought habits of judges. But they could not hold 
out. Industry had grown rich beyond belief. The risks of physical 
hurts could be distributed as well as could wages and other costs. Busi- 
ness no longer required protection against its workmen as did the house- 
hold of Lord Abinger's century. The dangers incident to employment 
were such that the most intelligent and loyal service could not prevent 
them. On the other hand workmen had become even more dependent 
upon the mercy of avaricious industrialists who would not of their 
own accord provide the preventive safeguards which were within their 
command. It was now seen that the power of society was needed to 
compel employers to purge their conduct towards their employees rather 
than the reverse. Juries had already forced the courts to do for years 
what the Court of Appeals of New York held the legislature had no 
power to do. The idea of "fault" in any moral sense in these cases 
had become bankrupt. Justice between the injured workman and his 
employer had been forced into the picture and once it had made itself 
recognized it was found to be in full harmony with the economics of 
industry. Whether it be called a liberalized ethical notion of responsi- 
bility, or a responsibility compelled by giving heed to other factors than 
those of morality, a new order of things was at hand. And the ad- 
ministration of this new scheme demanded a different technic from that 
of the orthodox courts-a technic untrammelled by the theories of ad- 
ministration which have so successfully strangled the courts when faced 
with large developments as the employee emancipation. 
Landowner and Intruder 
The negligence network of legal theory has been hastily sketched 
as it developed in master-servant cases as a pattern by which to indicate 
other developments either mature or now under way. The possibilities 
are many but the briefest outlines must suffice. Again familiar subject 
matters are chosen. 
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Land has an indefinite extent upwards as well as downwards.5' 
rhe owner may use his land as he pleases short of creating a nuisance.52 
Every entry thereon without the owner's leave is a trespass for which 
the owner may have his action.53 The owner owes a trespasser no duty 
other than not to intentionally harm him.54 No group of ideas has been 
harder set in the pronouncements of courts. Even the strong morality 
of the negligence theory has made slow progress against the landowner's 
preferential position. Assuming that by a process of "peaceful pene- 
tration" it has practically superseded the older concepts with reference 
to the uses made by a landowner of his property, negligence cannot yet 
wear its own garb. Unreasonable uses must still be spoken of and dealt 
with in terms of nuisance,55 and intruders on land are classified into 
multiple useless and confusing categories.56 But the question now has 
come to be, not whether the negligence process should be recognized as 
controlling the landowner, but whether he should not be controlled, in 
many instances at least, by even a more rational process for imposing 
responsibility. 
512 BL. COMM. *18; see Ball, The Jural Nature of Land, 23 ILL. L. REV. 45 
(1928); The Vertical Extent of Ownership in Land (1928) 76 U. OF PA. L. REV. 
631. 
52 Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, 3 BL. COMM. *217; Blythe v. Topham, 
1 Roll. Abr. 88, Cro. Jac. 158 (1607). See SHEARMAN & REDFIELD, NEGLIGENCE 
(3d ed. 1874) ? 496. 
533 BL. COMM. *209; Dougherty v. Stepp, 18 N. C. 371 (1835). 
Ilott v. Wilkes, supra note 19; Buch v. Amory Mfg. Co., 69 N. H. 257, 44 
Atl. 809 (1898); BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS (1926) 156. 
5 Beecher v. Dull, 143 Atl. 498 (Pa. 1928); (1929) 77 U. OF PA. L. REV. 550; 
McFarlane v. City of Niagara Falls, 247 N. Y. 340, 160 N. E. 391 (1928). The 
court in the latter case says: "Nuisance as a concept of law has more meanings 
than one. The primary meaning does not involve the element of negligence as 
one of its essential factors (Heig v. Licht, 80 N. Y. 579). One acts sometimes at 
one's peril." Ibid. 343, 160 N. E. at 391. 
It could be said as easily that it is unreasonable (negligent) to act at all in 
such cases. This is the position taken by Jeremiah Smith in the blasting cases. 
See Smith, Liability for Substantial Physical Damage to Land by Blasting 
(1920) 33 HARV. L. REV. 542, 549; SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF TORTS 
(1924) 614, 621, 633. See also 1 THOMPSON, NEGLIGENCE (1901) ? 675. 
6 The numerous categories of persons who may go upon land, ranging 
from a naked trespasser to a business guest, are of relatively recent origin, hav- 
ing developed simultaneously with the negligence theory of responsibility as a 
whole. They were invented to make the negligence concept more adaptable to 
the landowner's control. See SHEARMAN & REDFIELD, NEGLIGENCE (3d ed. 1874) 
c. XXVIII. The courts took over the trespass idea, a moral notion employed 
since the earliest developments of the common law, and made it serve the 
purpose of a stem on which to graft this whole new scheme of categories. The 
negligence formula of reasonable care was slow in taking form; it was vague 
at best. When applied to the infinite situations of the landowner towards 
persons coming on his land, it seemed to place far more power in the hands of 
a jury than the judges of the middle 1800's were willing to pass over to them. 
The expression of Pollock, C.B., in Hardcastle v. South Yorkshire Ry., 4 H. & 
N. 67 (1859) reflects what was said both before and after in these cases: "We 
do not see where the liability is to stop . . . it would be very dangerous . . if 
in every case it was to be left as a fact to the jury, whether the excavation 
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The most striking instance of this class of cases is probably found 
in the case of intrusions made by young children upon the premises of 
industrial land owners. The trespasser rule has had its bloodiest toll at 
this point.57 The landowner's responsibility was denied first because 
the intruder himself was a wrongdoer and there was no duty owed 
him, and in the absence of duty the idea of negligence was beside the 
point.58 A majority of courts conceded this ground but met it with a 
like moral argument. They said that the landowner who places danger- 
were sufficiently near to the highway to be dangerous." No one can read these 
cases without feeling the strong fear that landowners must be protected from 
juries. See Binks v. The South Yorkshire Ry. and River Dun Co., 3 B. & S. 
242 (1862); Hounsel v. Smyth, 7 C.B. (N.s.) 729 (1860); Southcote v. Stanley, 
1 H. & N. 247 (1856); Bolch v. Smith, 7 H. & N. 736 (1862) (no duty to 
licensee as to obvious danger); Gautret v. Egerton, L. R. 2 C.P. 371 (1867). 
Even as strong a case as Barnes v. Ward, 9 C. B. 392 (1850) gave the judges a 
great deal of trouble. 
In this formative period of negligence theory judges found that by classify- 
ing the persons into various classes they could more effectually control the 
power of the jury. The more classes, the more necessity of defining those 
classes, the more "duties" to be determined (the duty concept is the judge's con- 
trivance through which to exercise his power), and thus the fewer cases to be 
sent to a jury, and the more binding the instructions which accompanied the 
cases which were sent. It was thus an administrative device. But the results 
are distressing. These nice grades of persons represent the same idea as the 
degrees of negligence which were also based on classification of persons. They 
are more difficult because there are more of them and they are more deceptive 
in appearance. Except in the easy cases, in which no classification is needed 
in order to pass judgment, it is harder to determine what class the person falls 
'in than it is to decide the case. If courts generally recognized the fact that it 
was perfectly legitimate for them to classify the person according to the judg- 
ment they desired to reach, I should find little criticism of the scheme. But fre- 
quently they wrestle so hard in getting their person into the desired classification 
that not only are their own judgments clouded, but others who would rely on 
such judgments for guidance come also to take them seriously. For illustration 
see Sweeny v. Old Colony R. R., 10 Allen 368 (Mass. 1865); Brigman v. Fiske- 
Carter Construction Co., 192 N. C. 791, 136 S. E. 125 (1926). The trouble with 
such classification is that it seems to make judgment depend upon one factor alone, 
and this is wholly misleading. There are numerous factors found in nearly all 
of these cases, such as the nature of the premises, the extent of the danger, the 
age of the person, his physical capacity, his intelligence generally and his ac- 
quaintance with the particular situation, the occasion for his visit, and many 
others. The cases themselves reflect the monstrous results, both in legal theory 
and protection afforded particular persons, growing out of the attempt to focus 
judgment on the one factor of whether the intruder was a trespasser, licensee, 
invitee, business guest or some one of the sub-classes under each of these. See 
Colbert v. Holland Finance Co., 164 N. E. 162 (Ill. 1928), for strange use of 
"doctrine of invitation." 5 Smith, Liability of Landowners to Children Entering Without Permission 
(1898) 11 HARV. L. REV. 349, 434; SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF TORTS 
(1924) 357; Hudson, Turntable Cases in the Federal Courts (1923) 36 HARV. 
L. REV. 827; SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF TORTS (1924) 397. See lists of 
cases at the conclusions of these articles. See also many other articles cited in 
WILSON, CASES ON TORTS (1928) 543. 
Buch v. Amory Mfg. Co., supra note 54; D. L. & W. R. R. v. Reich, 
61 N. J. L. 635, 40 Atl. 682 (1898); Ryan v. Towar, 128 Mich. 463, 81 N. W. 644 
(1901); Cox v. Alabama Water Co., 112 So. 352 (Ala. 1927); Dobbins v. Mis- 
souri, etc., R. R, 41 S. W. 62 (Tex. 1897); Kaproli v. Central R. R., 143 Atl. 
343 (N. J. 1928) 
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ous and attractive machinery on his land thereby tempts young children, 
and his temptations amount to invitations and having invited them into 
his traps,59 he himself is a wrongdoer and hence responsible. They met 
the wrongful trespass of the child with a temptation by the landowner, 
and made the tempter pay the bill.60 This was no small theological 
feat. It is employing one morality to defeat another as is involved in 
defeating contributory negligence by "wilful" negligence.61 But it was 
an unnecessary method of reaching a good result,62 except for the fact 
that the judges thought it necessary under their accepted theory. But 
the medieval domestic establishment with its yards and meadows, culti- 
vated area and wild pasture, with its rock piles and fences, its brooks 
and decayed trees, is an entirely different sort of enterprise from that of 
a railway yard, a steam mill, a factory, a power system, a supply depot, 
an explosive storehouse, an abandoned plant, or many other such 
premises. It is different in drawing power for curious children, in the 
number and seriousness of the risks to which children are subjected, in 
the relative capacity of the landowner and parents to protect his prem- 
ises from intrusion by means of fences, gates, guards, or otherwise, and 
it is different in that the costs of affording such protection can be cared 
for as part of the costs of the enterprise, and more than all, it is differ- 
ent in that the risk when it results in hurt to the child can best be borne 
and absorbed by this type of landowner. To these may be added the 
now accepted recognition that children are responsibilities of the com- 
munity as a whole. Every consideration of economics, of ethics, of 
prevention, and of justice would all place a severe duty upon the land- 
owner in such cases. And inasmuch as contributory negligence is 
seldom a factor in these cases, and the question of reasonableness is 
normally one for the jury, with the almost certain result that the de- 
fendant will be required to pay, the difficulties of administering these 
5 Keffe v Milwaukee & St. P. Ry., 21 Minn. 207 (1875). 6 It is interesting to observe the seriousness with which the opponents of 
the doctrine argued against this point. See Smith's article, supra note 57; SE- 
LECTED ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF TORTS (1924) 360-368. 
6 Aiken v. Holyoke St. Ry., 184 Mass. 269, 68 N. E. 238 (1903); (1928) 17 
CALIF. L. REV. 65. 
62 Sioux City, etc., R. R. v. Stout, 17 Wall. 657 (U. S. 1873). In this leading 
case the court stated the doctrine with the utmost clarity. Defendant was 
negligent, plaintiff was too young to be contributorily negligent. The sinful 
plight of a trespasser upon land did not occur to the court. That was a ghost 
from the centuries past reincarnated in later cases. The court assumed the duty, 
i.e., that the negligence theory would apply to a landowner's use of his land as it 
does to the use of any other sort of property. Note also the good sense of 
Cooke v. Midland Great Western Ry., [1909] A.C. 229. The present method of 
rationalizing these cases is most inadequate. See United Zinc Co. v. Britt, 258 
U. S. 268, 42 Sup. Ct. .299 (1921); Darsch v. Brown, 164 N. E. 177 (Ill. 1928). 
Note the extreme position taken by one jurisdiction. Erie R. R. v. Hilt, 247 
U. S. 97, 38 Sup. Ct. 435 (1918). 
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cases through the orthodox judicial process required for negligence cases 
would overwhelmingly demand that they be placed upon some basis of 
insurance similar to the workmen's compensation device. There is no 
rational basis to be found for continuing to handle the problems created 
by the industrialist landowner in the same manner as those created by 
the farmer and small tradesman. The assumption (stated in the de- 
cisions as a principle) which runs through hundreds of these cases that 
all landowners are to be subjected to the same responsibility is not 
necessary, nor is it well founded. There is no legal theory so flexible 
that its results will not be used against itself if it is made to care for 
such widely variant cases. 
A somewhat similar development has taken place with reference 
to adults-those who walk on railway tracks or go upon the premises 
of industrial plants. Probably it is not startlingly immoral for persons to 
choose the smooth and dry roadbeds rather than the muddy streets of 
the outlying districts of large communities. Nor is it particularly sinful 
for people to satisfy their curiosities by entering and observing the 
operations of industrial plants. That these persons annoy and impose 
responsibilities upon the owner of such enterprises, even if only to keep 
intruders off the premises, is readily conceded. Nevertheless these 
curious intruders are found in increasing numbers invading these 
dangerous premises. And they are trespassers, or tolerated intruders 
at best,' until a court invests them with the rights and privileges of 
licensees in order that the harshness of the earlier rules may be obviated. 
Many courts insist that railway operatives are under a duty to keep a 
lookout for such persons, that other landowners must warn or protect 
them from hidden dangers, and must refrain from negligent action 
while such persons are present. The costs cast upon industry to furnish 
this somewhat "bootleg" protection to unwelcome "guests" is after all 
not crushing. It is true that n'either morals nor justice make a strong 
demand here in all cases. But the desirability of requiring the operators 
of the engines of traffic and the machines of industry to be highly re- 
gardful of human life, wherever it is encountered, and the ability of 
the owners and operatives to reduce the risks of hurt even as to those 
who insist upon subjecting themselves to such risks, is sufficient to war- 
rant judgment for plaintiffs in many of these cases. The creative 
power of the courts to raise an intruder from the category of a tres;- 
passer to that of an invitee affords a basis for finding a duty in terms of 
negligence theory. The power of judges to work such miracles has 
always been beyond the understanding of those who would insist upon 
the sanctity of principles. But somewhow or other judges come to 
recognize the habits of their fellow beings as reflected in constantly re- 
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curring tragic experiences, and to bend both principles and judgment 
to take them into account, long before the judges overcome their own 
habits of talking about such matters in the refined categories of "fault." 
Their judgments are years in advance of their language. Why continue 
to insist that there is no gulf between the thought and its expression? 
The judicial process does not require either the confusion or the bad 
habits resulting from carrying along these phrases which misrepresent 
everything that is being done. The normal negligence formula of 
"reasonable care under all the circumstances" was designed for just 
these cases in which judgment must have the widest range and in which 
uniformity, except in process, is impossible. The interests of the land- 
owner would be protected under this formula equally as well as the 
interests of other persons, and he deserves nothing more. Both judge 
and jury have the same power under it as they have under the cumber- 
some categories used for classifying intruders, and much greater facility 
for exercising their power rationally.63 
Crossing Cases 
The "Stop, Look and Listen" alliteration of three generations ago 
is still taken seriously. Contributory negligence continues to be a 
vigorous defense in these cases. The rules as to crossings grew up 
when travel was both slight and slow, when railroads were daring 
economic ventures, and when pioneer morality not only insisted that 
every man look out for himself, but when a traveler had some assurance 
that by looking out for himself he could protect himself. Today rail- 
roads maintain multiple tracks. They have multiplied the number of 
trains they run and have increased their speed. The public highways 
"There are many cases which fall into this group. The courts generally 
class the intruder as a trespasser or as a licensee or invitee as they desire to 
bless or damn him. Now and then a court deals with a case without resorting to 
these categories. See Southern Ry. v. Cochran, 29 F.(2d) 206 (C. C. A 5th, 1928); 
Lyman v. Hall, 219 N. W. 902 (Neb. 1928); McGlove v. Angus, 248 N. Y. 197, 
161 N. E. 469 (1928). But this is the exception. Norris v. Hugh N. C. Co., 
206 Mass. 58, 91 N. E. 886 (1910); Castonguay v. Acme, etc., Co, 136 Atl. 702 
(N. H. 1927); Moore v.. Ohio Oil Co., 241 Ill. App. 388 (1926); Loney v. 
Lawrence Auto Co., 255 Pac. 350 (Wyo. 1927); Roper v. Commercial Fibre Co., 
143 Atl. 741 (N. J. 1928); Pryotely v. N. Y., etc., Co., 28 F.(2d) 868 (C. C. A. 
6th, 1928); Humphrey v. Twin State Gas & Electric Co, 139 Atl. 440 (Vt. 1927); 
(1928) 12 MINN. L. REV. 420; Mallory v. Day Carpet & Furniture Co., 
245 Ill. App. 465 (1927); Teakle v. San Pedro, etc., R. R., 32 Utah 276, 90 Pac. 
402 (1906); Palmer v. Oregon S. L. R. Co., 34 Utah 466, 98 Pac. 689 (1908); F. 
& M. Warehouse Co. v. Perry, 118 So. 406 (Ala. 1928); Anderson v. Androscog- 
gin Pulp Co., 126 Me. 5, 135 Atl. 249 (1926) ; Kinsman v. Barton & Co., 141 Wash. 
311, 251 Pac. 563 (1926); Douglas v. Bergland, 216 Mich. 380, 185 N. W. 819 
(1921). Brigman v. Fiske-Carter Construction Co., 192 N. C. 791, 126 S. E. 125 
(1926); Southern Ry. v. Matthews, 29 F.(2d) 52 (C. C. A. 6th, 1928); Terre 
Haute, etc., Co. v. Terrell, 164 N. E. 307 (Ind. App. 1928); Richardson v. Whit- 
tier, 164 N. E. 384 (Mass. 1929); Smith v. Twin State Gas & Electric Co., 144 
Atl. 57 (1928). See exhaustive comment, (1929) 77 U. OF PA. L. REV. 506. 
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they intersect are crowded with fast moving traffic. In economic im- 
portance the gap between the highway and the railway has closed. The 
railway exercises a public franchise for private profit, while the highway 
is built and maintained at public cost for public use. The railway can 
protect the hordes of travellers by guards or passes at less cost and 
with more effect than travellers can protect themselves. The risks have 
increased both in number and in degree, but the railway has now grown 
rich. It is both able to protect against these risks and to distribute the 
loss when the protection fails. Every factor which determines judg- 
ment would seem to require that such risks should be eliminated alto- 
gether, but if any there should be, they should be placed upon the rail- 
way. The refined morals of negligence with its judge and jury process 
have no place here. Courts are constantly deciding tiese cases by hark- 
ing back to a day when life was ordered on an entirely different scale 
and when a stiff morality assumed to hold a dominant place in the ad- 
ministration of law. Current legal theory at this point is wholly inade- 
quate. The orthodox judicial process should be relieved of the bulk of 
this litigation.64 
"As I write this note the newspapers report a crossing accident at Bellevue, 
Ohio, in which seventeen passengers of a bus were killed and others injured. 
Two years ago almost the entire football squad of Baylor University were 
killed in such an accident near Austin, Texas. Buses loaded with school children 
are not infrequently in such collisions. The toll of dead and injured mounts 
into the thousands annually. 
The crossing problem was given great emphasis by the reversion to early 
type decision shown in Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Goodman, 275 U. S. 66, 48 
Sup. Ct. 24, 56 A. L. R. 645 (1927). See (1928) 16 CALIF. L. REV. 238; 
also extended Note (1926) 41 A. L. R. 405. The decision itself is very narrow, 
but even so, it points in the wrong direction. I understand that railroad com- 
panies posted and bulletined the opinion far and wide. Most jurisdictions 
fortunately have gone so far beyond the spirit of this case that they will not be 
greatly influenced by it. But judging from the numerous citations and discus- 
sions this decision has received it will probably work an over-cautiousness in 
many state courts and especially so in the federal courts The courts have never 
dallied quite so much with a serious problem which was at the same time so 
easy of solution. The following are only a few of the current cases: Greenwald 
v. B. & O. R. R., 164 N. E. 142 (I11. 1928); Rosencranz v. Mich. Cent. R. R., 244 
Mich. 147, 221 N. W. 273 (1928); Penna. R. R. v. Stegeman, 22 F.(2d) 69 (C. C. 
A. 6th, 1927); Jones v. Boston & M. R. R., 139 Atl. 214 (N. H. 1927); Buck v. 
Rutland R. R., 143 Atl. 297 (Vt. 1928); Haskins v. Penna. R. R., 143 Atl. 192 
(Pa. 1928); Grand Trunk Western Ry. v. Cathen, 163 N. E. 622 (Ind. App. 
1928); Anvil v. Western Md. Ry., 19 F.(2d) 30 (C. C. A. 4th, 1927); Ill. Cent. 
R. R. v. Leichner, 19 F.(2d) 118 (C. C. A. 5th, 1927); Moreland v. Chicago & 
N. W. Ry., 220 N. W. 692 (Neb. 1928); Germak v. Florida East Coast Ry., 117 
So. 391 (Fla. 1928); Settich v. B. & O. R. R., 29 F.(2d) 112 (C. C. A. 4th, 
1928). When the legislature seeks to minimize contributory negligence the 
courts are sometimes so thoroughly indoctrinated with the "fault" theory that 
the legislation amounts to little. Gray v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 23 F.(2d) 190 (C. C. 
A. 6th, 1928). But see Tenn. Cent. R. R. v. Page, 282 S. W. 376 (Tenn. 1926); 
Southern Ry. v. Johnson, 143 S. W. 887 (Va. 1928). 
Even though courts take a most liberal attitude towards persons injured at 
crossings, the negligence theory is wholly inadequate to cope with the situation. 
The situation demands such stringency as to eliminate the risk. Norfolk & W. 
Ry. v. Holbrook, 27 F.(2d) 326 (C. C. A. 6th, 1928); Lawson v. Minneapolis, 
etc., Ry., 219 N. W. 554 (Minn. 1928). 
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Automobile Cases 
Probably the general traffic cases-pedestrian and motorist, motor- 
ist and motorist-furnish by far the largest number of cases of the 
current day.65 And doubtless also legal theory is here most out of 
joint. This is true despite the fact that insurance companies are con- 
stantly absorbing the overwhelming amount of these losses without suit, 
and in the face of the further fact that jury verdicts are little short of 
unanimity for the injured party. Ordinarily it is the most dubious 
case, either on negligence itself or on the legitimacy of the claim, that 
reaches the courthouse. The courts find themselves struggling hope- 
lessly under this mass of cases. The licenses required for driver and 
car, speed laws, lights and brakes, rules of the road, traffic cautions and 
signals, together with an enormous increase of traffic officers do not 
appreciably cut down the number of injuries, the risks, or the work of 
the courts. As though there were no other way to do the job, the courts 
continue to inquire into the "fault" of the respective parties.66 In 
quantity of litigation, and also in the legal theories applicable to the 
particular case, traffic litigation is reaching totals far in excess of the 
enormous master-servant litigation of a generation ago. 
But whatever the price, we have given over our ways to the motor 
vehicle, although the last one of us may become its victim. There can 
be no recessional. All the protective devices we shall design will not be 
enough. The "family purpose"67 and "joint enterprise"68 doctrines help 
65 Report of Calendar Committee, N'. Y. L. J., June 23, 1927. See excellent 
article of Marx, Compulsory Compensation Insurance (1925) 25 COLUMBIA LAW 
REV. 164. 6 The following are merely typical of the cases reported in the current 
reports: Woolmer v. Perry, 163 N. E. 750 (Mass. 1928); Johnson v. Boston & 
M. R. R., 143 Atl. 516 (N. H. 1928); Cole v. Wilson, 143 Atl. 178 (Me. 1928); 
Brotman v. Doan, 143 Atl. 328 (N. J. 1928); Harber v. Graham, 143 Atl. 349 
(N. J. 1928); Coombs v. Markley, 143 Atl. 261 (Me. 1928); Galvin v. Kreider, 
143 Atl. 110 (Pa. 1928); Jacobson v. Parish, 4 S. W. (2d) 87 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1927); Gaboury v. Tisdell, 158 N. E. 348 (Mass. 1927); Bowman v. Stoutman, 
141 Atl. 41 (Pa. 1928); Village of Newburgh Heights v. Vanek, 163 N. E. 721 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1928); Silver v. Silver, 143 Atl. 240 (Conn. 1928); Blands v. 
Kulesva, 141 Atl. 106 (Conn. 1928); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Shipp, 299 S. W. 
856 (Ark. 1927); Baker v. Hurwitch, 164 N. E. 87 (Mass. 1928). See five such 
cases reported from one sitting of the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut, 
143 Atl. 881, 888 (1928). 
67 Goss v. Williams, 145 S. E. 169, 172 (N. C. 1928). The following excerpt 
from the opinion indicates how much more good sense there is in talking in 
terms other than rules: "The question (family purpose doctrine) is for the first 
time presented to this court. The common law is elastic to meet the complex 
problems of the age as they arise, but courts should be slow and not enter the 
realm of legislation. Last year 22,160 people were killed in automobile accidents 
on the highways of the United States. In North Carolina, the last year, 571 
were killed. During the first six months of this year 262 people in North Caro- 
lina were killed in automobile accidents, or an average of about 1'/2 a day, while 
an additional 2,088 were injured. The state total of motor cars on August 1, 
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some but they do not go far. Too many people will continue to be, hurt 
and subjected to serious risk without adequate protection. What court 
or group of laymen can so weigh faults as to pass with any precision 
upon the conduct of two swiftly moving automobiles, or two human 
beings equally bent on getting every second out of the day? And what 
difference does it make if they could? The motorist has chosen to 
make the streets unsafe. He is the one who gets the advantages from 
subjecting the pedestrian to perils. He can protect himself from finan- 
cial hurt by a pittance, and as against the pedestrian at least, he runs 
little risk of suffering hurt either to his person or property. His ability 
to afford the advantages of a motor implies a like ability to supply pro- 
tection against its hurts. In short, he imposes the risk, why should he 
not bear the loss when it comes ? Justice is at her best here. And the 
case of motorist and motorist is little different. While justice is prob- 
ably neutral as between these, the demands of a workaday world supply 
equally as severe exactions. The same economy is involved in compen- 
sating the hurt individual who either supports a family or is supported 
by some one who does as is involved in the employer-employee cases. 
Insurance is the best available protection we have against the inevitable. 
The hurts and injuries of a motorized society are largely of that type. 
Morality, economy, and justice would all require the person who creates 
hazards on a large scale to avail himself of the protection insurance 
gives in behalf of his victims. And of equal importance, the adminis- 
tration of these cases would require that the judges of orthodox courts 
be rid of this litigation by machinery of simpler design. No rational 
opinion would require courts with their delicately poised theories ofl 
negligence to stagger under these increasing burdens any longer than the 
1928, was 440,258. Passenger cars numbered 396,295; trucks 43,963. State 
average, one motor car to every 6.6 inhabitants. 
"Human life is too cheap and restraint is necessary. The numbers killed 
and crippled each year are appalling. It is necessary, in reason, for the courts 
to hold the owners of automobiles, when they turn over an instrumentality of 
this kind to the family for family use, to strict accountability. This is one of 
the means to safeguard the public. The head is usually the one of financial 
responsibility, at least he is the owner of the instrumentality. Upon the 
principles cited, consonant with natural justice, he should be held responsible." 
Much faster headway with much less confusion would doubtless have re- 
sulted had the courts in earlier cases dealing with this problem faced it with 
more frankness instead of wasting so much time debating tenuous legal theories. 
See Lattin, Vicarious Liability and the Family Automobile (1928) 26 MICH. L. 
REV. 846; King v. Smythe, 140 Tenn. 217, 204 S. W. 296 (1918); In re Opinion 
of the Justices, 251 Mass. 569, 594, 147 N'. E. 681, 693 (1925). But see Smith 
v. Callahan, 144 Atl. 46 (Del. 1929) for an opinion which insists upon the in- 
tegrity of legal rules. 
68See Note (1927) 48 A. L. R. 1078. 
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time required to fashion legislation to care for them.69 In this class 
of negligence cases, as in those already discussed and others not dis- 
cussed, it would seem that the duty problem has been determined so 
definitely and responsibility has been indicated so decisively through 
years of litigation, that nothing is left to be done which cannot be better 
performed by some less ponderous agency than an orthodox court. 
The expense item alone that comes from choking the judicial process 
with these cases is literally incalculable. 
Functions of the Judicial Process 
The judicial process in negligence cases is not greatly dissimilar 
from the judicial process in other cases. But negligence cases have af- 
forded the process its greatest flexibility. It is extensive in these cases 
because of the machinery required in making use of a jury, and more so 
because negligence cases concern more largely the infinite variety of 
workaday contacts involved in the operation and development of the 
machines of industry and commerce. The judicial process in negligence 
cases is the experimental machinery of government-by-judges through 
which a restless and changing industrial society is furnished protection 
against its self-inflicted physical hurts. Only a few of the implications 
of such a conclusion can be stated here. 
The most important, and the one most overlooked, is that "neg- 
ligence" is a short term for a complex situation. There is some talk 
about a "tort of negligence." This can only be intended in a catchword 
sense. Government furnishes for use in the infinite variety of cases 
classed as "negligent," (and that only after the hurt has been received), 
a process consisting of judge and jury, plus "ready to wear" formulas 
for ascertaining the judgment of judge and jury, as a means of ad- 
69See Elsbree and Roberts, Compulsory Insurance Against Motor Vehicle 
Accidents (1928) 76 U. OF PA. L. REV. 690; Lohman, Compulsory Automobile 
Insurance (1927) 130 THE ANNALS OF THE AM. ACADEMY OF POL. & SOCIAL 
ScI. 163. 
The following is an excerpt taken from a New York Times report (Sunday, 
Jan. 27, 1929) of a speech made by A. B. Barker, manager, transportation depart- 
ment, Chamber of Commerce of the United States: 
For these three groups of percentages of increases in automobile 
fatalities between 1920 and 1927 are: 
North Atlantic States (Maine to Maryland, inclusive): 
Increase in automobile registrations ........................... 176% 
Increase in fatalities ...................................... .... 74% 
Middle Western States (Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, 
Minnesota, Missouri, Kansas and Nebraska): 
Increase in automobile registrations ....... .................... 157% 
Increase in fatalities .......................................... 134% 
Southern States (Virginia, North and South Carolina, Kentucky, 
Tennessee, Mississippi and Louisiana): 
Increase in automobile registrations ........................... 210% 
Increase in fatalities. ......................................... 259% 
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justing the loss. Another way of saying the same thing is that judge 
and jury with their paraphernalia are furnished as a means for deter- 
mining the defendant's responsibility and assessing the damages. I have 
already outlined somewhat how the process works. Its first step in- 
volves a determination of "duties" by the judge-an alteration of some 
general formula to fit the particular case-and it is about this phase of 
the process that legal theories are thickest. Judges have stated many 
rules in an attempt to make the determination of "duties" easier. 
In the course of any period of economic activity during which lit- 
igationl increases greatly, current legal rules and theories reach the 
breaking point at many places. The requirements of business, ethical 
standards, the available safeguards, the relative capacity of parties to 
bear the risk involved, the exigencies of administration, or one or more 
of these factors, invariably changes. Thus the rules and theories which 
courts devise at one stage fall out of joint at succeeding stages. It is a 
habit of long standing to think of the rules and theories developed by 
courts as involving "principles" to which adherence must be given at 
all costs. Human nature is so constituted that it normally insists on 
standing by its "principles." Here are found serious difficulties of 
readjustment and realignment. As a matter of fact, so far as rules of 
law are concerned these "principles" are nothing more than the general- 
izations (assumptions) drawn from the factors which determined the 
initial judgment; the hypotheses upon which a theory of responsibility 
was based. And these factors having changed, the initial judgment 
should no longer stand. "Principles" should therefore be expected to 
vary as do the factors which support them, but as a matter of fact they 
lag far behind. Usually they are never again in alignment after the 
first judgment. 
In contrast, the other parts of the judicial process-the judge and 
jury-newly set up with each new case, permit the widest latitude in 
passing judgment with reference to the factors which at any particular 
time and place may then appear to be relevant. Too little attention has 
been paid to these parts of the process. They are of greater importance 
than rules and formulas, and no statement of rules made without ref- 
erence to the purpose they are to perform can be of any value. In fact 
it has been assumed that these variables (judge and jury) could and 
should also be stabilized by rules and formulas. It is thus that such 
tremendous emphasis has come to be placed on rules and formulas as 
stabilizing factors. But it ought to be obvious that a process designed 
for adaptability cannot and should not, either in operation or in results, 
be subjected to any high standardization. And here lies the chief mis- 
take of those who have worked so assiduously to standardize the "law 
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of negligence." The process in negligence cases, of all the patterns of 
the judicial process, is least fixed and most flexible. Judge, jury, and 
formulas which go to make up the process may react differently in 
every case. The process is highly individualistic, highly elastic. It 
allows the widest latitude for judgment. No aggregate of scholars or 
judges or practitioners can anticipate its judgment with assurance in a 
single complex case. Each case is new to it and must be subjected to it 
for a fresh judgment. It is slow and tedious. It is not designed to 
carry the heavy burdens of the types of cases for which responsibility 
has been developed through it. It only operates efficiently so long as 
a solution is being pondered. When society has made up its mind and 
insists upon quantity production-something automatic and uniform, 
something simple and "fool proof"-the high individualism of the judi- 
cial process in negligence cases will prevent its meeting these demands. 
Here the stage of experiment has passed and a standardized machinery 
which gives dependable results without exacting too much judgment is 
required. This is the stage for highly specialized courts,70 for work- 
men's compensation, inspection, licenses, commissions and other so-called 
administrative devices. The slowness with which intelligent opinion 
accepts these instrumentalities can only be understood by recalling how 
bitterly at every step the hand and muscle workers generally have fought 
the advent of labor saving machinery. It is widely assumed that these 
administrative agencies are in some way set up in opposition to the 
courts, and thus they have frequently drawn the fire of the courts them- 
selves. As a matter of fact they are designed to relieve the courts of 
work that they should not be expected to do, are not equipped to do, and 
are not needed to do. It is enough for the courts to keep these agencies 
acting within reasonable bounds. As a matter of fact a workmen's 
compensation or similar board is much like a specialized jury, but one 
that does not require the close watch and superintendence required by a 
common law jury. As here suggested, such an agency would be 
a specialized assessor of damages. The courts would continue to ex- 
ercise the power of supervision as to important questions which still 
should be subjected to the judicial process for solution, but would be 
relieved of the mass of minutiae which so quickly clog the judicial 
process and prevent it from performing the important functions for 
which it was set up. 
70 The traffic courts in most cities are not much more than collection agencies. 
The penalities imposed are highly uniform, and it is only the most exceptional 
case that is subjected to the judicial process in the sense of trial. The same 
tendency is marked in the courts of congested centers with reference to the 
prohibition cases. The handling of uncontested divorce cases is of the same 
character. It must be, when a single judge, as one Houston, Texas, judge did, 
may grant in excess of 200 divorces in a single day. Even the more conservative 
Connecticut courts denied divorces in only 28 out of 1554 such cases during a 
two-year period. There are other similar classes of cases. See Clark, Fact 
Research in Law Administration (1928) 2 CONN. BAR J. 211. 
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But it is not always necessary that courts await legislation to re- 
lieve them of the glut of cases which their own process has brought upon 
them. Judges may gauge their power within limits from the most 
drastic to the other extreme. They have often reduced litigation to the 
vanishing point. Rules and formulas and doctrines are seldom designed 
as controls of judicial behavior, but are the means for judges to employ 
in their control of the conduct of others. That judges are controlled 
somewhat by the rules, formulas and doctrines which they use is of 
course as inevitable as that any one is influenced by his environment. 
But judges are expected, as are other persons, to be able to maintain 
a fair domination of their surroundings, and in the main they do so. 
Judges were not helpless in reducing to a simple basis the responsibility 
of the keeper of wild animals for the hurts done by them. The pro- 
tection of property from the invasion of domestic animals was likewise 
made decisive. Courts of the western and southern states completely 
reversed the common law theory requiring the owners of cattle to fence 
them in. The extreme use of power in Rylands v. Fletcher was not 
as misguided as sometimes thought.71 The practical elimination of the 
71 See Green v. General Pet. Corp., 270 Pac. 952 (Cal. 1928) in which an oil 
company was held responsible to adjacent land owner for damages done to his 
property by blowing out of oil well which was being drilled with all due care. It 
is most misleading to think of these cases as accurately described by the catch- 
phrase "absolute liability." The attitude of the California court is a good ex- 
ample. It had repudiated this "doctrine" in the dam cases. Sutliff v. Sweetwater 
Water Co., 182 Cal. 34, 186 Pac. 766 (1920). See Green v. General Petroleum 
Corp., 262 Pac. 377 (Cal. 1928). The economic factors were aligned differently 
in California in 1920 than they were in England in 1860. But when the Green 
case came along, the court properly ignored the commitment it had made doc- 
trinally and decided the case on a broader basis. The dangers of doctrines 
are not always so easily escaped. The attempt made by the court to keep its 
legal theory intact and its resort to the "sic utere," etc., maxim, are most in- 
teresting. A somewhat similar situation is involved where both the railroad and 
farmer have permitted the right of way and farm respectively to grow up in 
grass. Sparks from a well-equipped and operated engine set fire to the grass 
on the right-of-way and the farmer's property is burned. See Kellogg v. Rail- 
way, 26 Wis. 233 (1870); cases cited in BOHLEN, CASES ON TORTS (2d ed. 1925) 
506. The courts say "the doctrine of contributory negligence is entirely out of 
place here." Leroy Fibre Co. v. Chicago, etc., Ry., 232 U. S. 340, 34 Sup. Ct. 
415 (1914). But why so? Do not the courts mean that the economic and justice 
factors are so strong in these cases that there is no place for matching moralities 
(faults) ? Does this mean that the same conclusions must be reached in such 
cases at other times and under other conditions? Would the same rule be ap- 
plied between farmers owning adjacent farms? 
A gasoline filling station may be a nuisance in every sense of that word ex- 
cept in the court's judgment. It may reduce the value of adjoining property, 
create fire hazards, turn a quiet corner into a noisy one to the aggravation of 
the whole neighborhood, increase the dangers from traffic to the neighborhood 
children, but to a world which uses automobiles, filling stations are indispensable. 
Brown v. Easterling, 110 Neb. 729, 194 N. W. 798 (1923); Powell v. Craig, 113 
Ohio St. 245, 148 N'. E. 607 (1925); Hanes v. Carolina Cadillac Co., 176 N. C. 
360, 97 S. E. 162 (1918); cf. Carney v. Pa. Oil Co., 140 Atl. 133 (Pa. 1928). 
Pure business practicalities have the right-of-way in many such groups of cases. 
The same sort of problem is inevitable in determining the aviator's liability. 
See LEE, LAW MEMORANDA UPON CIVIL ARONAUTICS (U. S. Printing Office 
1928) 89 et seq. 
282 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.21 on Thu, 13 Jun 2013 17:07:47 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
DUTY PROBLEM IN NEGLIGENCE CASES: II 283 
passenger-railway damage suit was a result of equally severe use of 
power.72 The negligence per se device in cases involving violations of 
police regulations tends in the same direction and would be efficacious 
were it not too drastic for many cases, and were it not possible under 
the doctrine of contributory negligence and proximate cause to use it 
just as effectively to defeat the very purpose for which it is designed. 
Slander per se and libel per se save many extended inquiries. The "in- 
nocent misrepresentation" doctrine when fully matured will do even 
more in facilitating the administration of deceit cases.73 There are 
other instances doubtless more significant. Whenever judges have felt 
that the stage of experimenting was past and certain adjustments to be 
desirable, they have seldom hesitated to employ their power to such 
ends. That is what they should do. Probably after all, a vocabulary of 
absorbent phrases which defy rational analysis enables them to exer- 
cise this power all the more frictionlessly. But I disclaim for them any 
purposeful vagueness. I rather believe that most judges feel them- 
selves bound by what they choose to think a technic of long development, 
and they feel they must be able to translate the factors which are here 
sought to be identified into such technic before they can conscientiously 
consider them in passing judgment. They are thus not infrequently 
impelled to surrender their power of passing judgment to what appear 
to be the exigencies of their legal theory. That there are other judges 
who have expanded the bonds of any such technic is equally certain. 
Their habit of dragging the factors which control judgment out into the 
open beyond the reach of unnecessary language paraphernalia is one 
to be encouraged.74 Nothing, on the one hand, will so promote a legal 
science as the recognition of the limitations of language as a control of 
judgment. And on the other hand, there is no instrumentality so neces- 
sary in making judgment effective as highly adaptable words. But 
these words do not have to be "canonized." "Rights" and "duties," 
"wrongs" and "faults" and their kindred must surrender their sanctity; 
72 See supra note 3. 
73 See Miller, Innocent Misrepresentation as the Basis of an Action for 
Deceit (1928) 6 TEX. L. REv. 151; Comment (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 1141. 74 The clear expression of Cardozo, C. J., in Hesse v. Rath, 249 N. Y. 435, 
164 N. E. 342 (1928), holding that the acquisition of an airport is a public and 
municipal purpose is a good example: "Aviation is today an established method 
of transportation. The future, even the near future, will make it still more 
general. The city that is without the foresight to build the ports for the new 
traffic may soon be left behind in the race of competition. Chalcedon was called 
the city of the blind, because its founders rejected the nobler site of Byzantium 
lying at their feet. The need for vision of the future in the governance of 
cities has not lessened with the years. The dweller within the gates, even more 
than the stranger from afar, will pay the price of blindness." The celebrated 
case of Slover v. Ransom by the same court, 224 N. Y. 233, 120 N. E. 639 
(1918), is of the same sort. See also the remarks of Chief Justice Taft in 
Weil v. Neary, 49 Sup. Ct. 144, 149 (U. S. 1928). 
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scientific government is opposed. They are not to be trusted with power 
beyond that of conveying thought. We need less "authoritativeness" 
than we think. Judgment in the particular case, based upon all the 
factors which may be relevant at the time and place, as unobstructed 
and as clear as it can be given, is the immediate function of the mul- 
tiple coiled judicial process. There is no assurance in such a formula 
save as it may be grasped by the intelligence of those to whom the power 
to pass judgment is entrusted. But government hangs here. 
LEON GREEN 
YALE LAW SCHOOL 
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